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The study analyses the gender pay gap in private-sector management positions in Germany 
based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for the years 2001-
2008. It focuses in particular on gender segregation in the labor market, that is, on the unequal 
distribution of women and men across different occupations and on the effects of this 
inequality on earnings levels and gender wage differentials in management positions. Our 
paper is, to our knowledge, the first in Germany to use time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity and gender-specific promotion probabilities to estimate wages and wage 
differentials for persons in managerial positions. The results of the fixed effects model show 
that working in a more “female” job, as opposed to a more “male” job, affects only women’s 
wages negatively. This result remains stable after controlling for human capital endowments 
and other effects. Mechanisms of the devaluation of jobs not primarily held by men also 
negatively affect pay in management positions (evaluative discrimination) and are even more 
severe for women (allocative discrimination). However, the effect is not linear; the wage 
penalties for women occur only in “integrated” (more equally male/female) jobs as opposed to 
typically male jobs, and not in typically female jobs. The devaluation of occupations that are 
not primarily held by men becomes even more evident when promotion probabilities are taken 
into account. An Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition of the wage differential between men and 
women in management positions shows that the full model explains 65 percent of the gender 
pay gap. In other words: Thirty-five percent remain unexplained; this portion reflects, for 
example, time-varying social and cultural conditions, such as discriminatory policies and 
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  11  Introduction 
 
Many national and international studies on the gender pay gap show a wage disadvantage for 
women (Bardasi/Gornick 2008; Kunze 2008; Cohen, Philip N./Huffman 2007; Blau/Kahn 
2006; Fitzenberger/Kunze 2005; Blau/Kahn 2003, 2000; Waldfogel 1998; Jacobs/Steinberg 
1995a; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Marini 1989). Germany had a (raw) wage pay gap of 23.2 
percent in 2008, one of the highest in the European Union (European Commission 2010). 
However, few articles to date have examined the gender pay gap in management positions in 
Germany (see for other countries: Kirchmeyer 2002; Bertrand/Hallock 2001; Lausten 2001; 
see for academics in Germany: Leuze/Strauß 2009). The present study seeks to fill this lacuna 
by analyzing the gender pay gap in private-sector management positions in Germany based on 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) (Wagner et al. 2007).  
We focus in particular on gender-specific labor market segregation—the observation that 
women and men are distributed unequally across occupations and within occupational 
hierarchies—and the effects of this segregation on earnings and gender wage differentials in 
management positions. In Germany, gender-specific labor market segregation has remained 
very stable over time (Trappe/Rosenfeld 2004): most women still work in typical “women’s 
jobs” and most men in typical “men’s jobs.” Segregation is also found in managerial positions 
in Germany. On the one hand we see vertical segregation: women tend to work at lower 
hierarchical levels than men—even within management the upper echelons of which are 
mainly occupied by men. The higher the hierarchy is the lower the share of women in it 
(Holst/Wiemer 2010a, b, Holst/Busch 2010). On the other hand, we see horizontal 
segregation: the majority of men and only a minority of women in management positions 
work in typically “male” jobs. While women in management are less segregated than other 
female employees, the opposite is true for men (Holst/Busch 2010). Further, managerial 
positions show gender-specific occupational differences in the size of the enterprise, the 
sector of the economy, and the industry (Bischoff 2010; Kleinert et al. 2007): women more 
often head smaller firms, and they more frequently work in health care, welfare, and in the 
private services. Women with a university degree more often choose a field of study that is 
dominated by women, such as humanities (Leuze/Strauß 2009). In addition, female managers 
are more often employed in public services than in the private sector (Brader/Lewerenz 2006). 
Women’s occupations are generally characterized by worse employment conditions in terms 
of wages; many studies analyze the effects of working in a gender-typical or -atypical 
  2occupation on wages and wage differentials between women and men (Busch/Holst 2010, 
2009; Cohen, Philip N./Huffman 2007; Hinz/Gartner 2005; Cohen, Philip N/Huffman 2003; 
Jacobs/Steinberg 1995b; England 1992; England et al. 1988). The question that is not fully 
answered is why this wage penalty even in management still exists where “the best of the 
best” are being employed. 
To control for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity, we use fixed effects panel models to 
estimate wages and wage differentials of women and men in management positions. As 
promotion probabilities are highly gender-biased in Germany (Holst/Busch 2010; Fietze et al. 
2009) we take gender-specific promotion probabilities into account by employing a special 
version of Heckman selection (Heckman 1979). We use these strategies to obtain unbiased 
estimators of the coefficients for the wage effects of working in a gender-segregated 
occupation. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the gender pay gap in managerial 
positions has been analyzed in the German context by taking fixed effects and selection bias 
into account simultaneously (see for the US: England et al. 1988). Finally, we decompose the 
gender pay differential to explain the extent to which the gender pay differential is related to 
gender-specific segregation on the labor market and to other components of our wage 
equation (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973).  
The study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the key theories explaining the 
dependency between gender-specific labor market segregation and wages, discuss the current 
state of research, and formulate our working hypotheses. In section 3, we present the 
multivariate method for quantitative analysis of the gender-specific wage differential in 
management positions. In Section 4, we explain our database and variables, and in Section 5 
we present the empirical findings. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize the results and draw 
conclusions. 
 
2  Theoretical background 
 
Human Capital Approach 
From an economic point of view, the effect of working in a “segregated” (male or female) job 
on wages can be explained through different investments in human capital. The different 
human capital investments of men and women are interpreted as being the result of a rational 
cost-utility calculation (Becker 1993, 1991): an assumption is that women have stronger 
preferences for family work than men and that these affect their choices of lower-paid 
  3occupations and less successful career paths. Hence, for women, investments in education, 
work, and on-the-job-training appear less profitable since the accumulated knowledge 
becomes obsolete during breaks in employment (Blau et al. 2006; Tam 1997; Mincer 1962). 
As a result, women invest less in education. Human capital theory uses the concept of self-
selection to explain the different proportions of women and men in certain occupations and 
thus the emergence of gender-specific labor market segregation (Polachek 1981). According 
to this idea, women rationally choose particular jobs that can be combined with family 
responsibilities—for example, jobs that have lower opportunity costs when working part-time 
or when employment is interrupted. These are mainly lower-paid jobs. The higher the human 
capital endowment, and thus the higher the opportunity costs, the lower this effect will be. 
Becker (1985) assumes that even with the same human capital endowment, it is rational for an 
employer to pay married women less than men in the same job: “Since housework is more 
effort intensive than leisure and other household activities, married women spend less energy 
on each hour of market work than married men working the same number of hours. As a 
result, married women have lower hourly earnings than married men with the same human 
capital, and they economize on the energy expended on market work by seeking less 
demanding jobs” (Becker 1985: 55). 
Based on these assumptions, we can formulate the following hypotheses on the dependency 
between segregation and wages in managerial positions: 
 
H1: Female occupations pay less than male occupations, even at the management level; this 
holds for both women and men working in these occupations.  
 
However, the implicit “given” in the human capital approach of gender-specific preferences 
was criticized early on in a number of studies (e.g. England 1989; for an overview, see Ferber 
1987). In the early 1980s, it was also shown that women who planned to interrupt their 
careers did not, contrary to the hypothesis of self-selection, choose “female” jobs more 
frequently than other women (England 1982). In addition, an analysis for West Germany 
showed that career breaks do indeed have a negative effect on both men’s and women’s 
wages, and that this negative effect is particularly strong if the interruption occurred due to 
family responsibilities (e.g., parental leave) (Beblo/Wolf 2002). Empirical studies show as 
well that women are “trapped” from the very start of their career, in the sense of experiencing 
a “lock-in-effect” in occupations with lower pay (Fitzenberger/Kunze 2005). 
  4 
Devaluation Approach 
At this point, we turn to the devaluation approaches to explain gender-specific wage 
differences. Here, it is assumed that the historically dominant “male breadwinner” model, in 
which women are responsible for the unpaid housework and men for the paid work, lead to 
corresponding gender-specific values and norms internalized by the individuals—and thus to 
gender-specific orientations and needs (“preferences”) for special jobs, as well as to 
discriminatory practices on the labor market (Gottschall 2000; Beck 1986; Beck-Gernsheim 
1980). The internalization of gender roles in values and norms is (re)produced by a “doing 
gender” in everyday interaction processes (Ridgeway/Smith-Lovin 1999; Ridgeway 1997; 
West/Zimmerman 1987): in order to reduce the amount and complexity of information in 
daily face-to-face interactions, people make gender-specific assumptions about the person 
with whom they are interacting. These assumptions form the basis for gender stereotypes that 
are shaped by cultural perceptions about what constitutes “male” and “female.” Nelson (1996) 
argues that individuals tend to think dualistically and to ascribe abilities hierarchically 
according to gender norms. The characterization “rational” is usually ascribed to men and 
valued more in the labor market than “emotional” ("emotional work don't 'count'", England 
1989: 24) which is usually ascribed as a “female” characteristic developed by providing 
unpaid family work at home. Accordingly, expectations about potential performance differ by 
gender—and this may result in wage penalties for women.  
As far as pay is concerned the devaluation hypothesis postulates a general devaluation of 
female work (Liebeskind 2004; England 1992; Steinberg 1990; England et al. 1988). This 
devaluation leads to lower pay for “female” jobs independent of human capital; the higher the 
percentage of women in a specific job the lower the pay for women as well as for men. This is 
referred to in the literature as “evaluative discrimination” (Achatz et al. 2005; Peterson/ 
Saporta 2004). In addition, studies have shown that even within a specific job (i.e., within a 
female-dominated, male-dominated, or gender-integrated profession), the work of women is 
devaluated and paid less than that of men. This is labeled “allocative discrimination” (Achatz 
et al. 2005; Peterson/Saporta 2004).
1 In line with so-called intergroup conflicts (Blalock 
1967), this allocative discrimination may also be due to an increase in perceived threats and 
perceived competition over scarce resources as more individuals of the opposite gender enter 
                                                 
1 The term “evaluative” indicates that one job is valued less than another solely because it is numerically 
dominated by one group of persons (men/women), independently of the real tasks and demands of the job 
(Achatz et al. 2005: 469). “Allocative” discrimination involves wage disadvantages that result from hiring, 
promotion, and dismissal or firing, which are difficult to document (Peterson/Saporta 2004: 859). 
  5the workplace. Women as the lower status group on the labor market (Correll/Ridgeway 
2006) are disadvantaged in such conflicts because they have less power. As a result, women 
in men’s jobs may be seen by men as a threat, which may have negative consequences 
especially for their wages. 
The devaluation hypothesis has been controversial in the literature. It is generally 
acknowledged that on average wages in typical women’s jobs are lower than in typical men’s 
jobs (Olsen/Walby 2004; Jacobs/Steinberg 1995b). But there is no consensus on the reasons 
for these findings (England et al. 2000; Tam 2000, 1997; Kilbourne et al. 1994; England et al. 
1988). However, neither of the aforementioned studies makes a clear distinction between 
evaluative and allocative discrimination. An explicit analytical distinction between these 
dimensions of discrimination was made in a German study by Achatz et al. (2005) identifying 
evaluative as well as allocative discrimination. Wages decreased with an increasing 
percentage of women in a job cell,
2 and this wage disadvantage was higher for women than 
for men. Busch/Holst (2010) found a similar result for the increasing percentage of women in 
an occupation focusing on women and men in management positions in Germany 2006 
(Busch/Holst 2010). 
Based on these considerations, the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 
H2: After accounting for human capital effects, there is still a negative wage effect of working 
in a women’s job, which is due to devaluation (evaluative discrimination). 
 
H3: The negative wage effect of working in a women’s job is stronger for women than for 
men. This is due to allocative discrimination. 
 
The devaluation mechanisms are intensified by stereotyped “gender status beliefs,” ideas that 
one gender is more competent and thus higher in status. The result of such beliefs is that, in 
general, men are seen as justified in holding higher positions of power and privilege 
(Ridgeway/Smith-Lovin 1999; Ridgeway 1997). This phenomenon is even more prevalent in 
top positions. An invisible barrier - known as the “glass ceiling” – is preventing women from 
climbing the career ladder beyond a certain level (International Labour Office 2004; Wirth 
2001). Men are expected to possess higher work-related skills and abilities and to show higher 
                                                 
2 Others did not use the percentage of women in the jobs, but the percentage of women in job cells. This was 
calculated as the percentage of (full-time employed) women in a job per firm (Achatz et al. 2005: 474). This was 
possible because they used firm-level data instead of individual micro-data.  
  6performance and productivity than women (see also Correll/Ridgeway 2006; Ridgeway 2001; 
Foschi 1996). This results in different career and pay opportunities for men and women since 
wages reflect the expected productivity of the employee. Employers tend to believe that 
women fit the management profile less especially the leadership profile; and as a result of 
these and contrasting assumptions about “male” leadership qualities employers attribute a 
higher competence in this area to men (Gmür 2006, 2004; Eagly/Karau 2002; Ridgeway 
1997). In addition, according to the “homophily principle” which states that people interact 
primarily with others who are similar in given characteristics and build gender-homogeneous 
networks (McPherson et al. 2001; Ibarra 1997, 1992; McPherson/Smith-Lovin 1987) when 
making decisions about promotion individuals prefer others who are similar in given 
characteristics (like gender). Consequently, the predominantly male decision-makers prefer to 
promote men to management positions (Ridgeway 1997). If, despite the barriers women 
obtain a managerial position they are highly visible “tokens” (Kanter 1977) and thus subjected 
to a more rigorous evaluation of their performance and possible mistakes than men. This 
increases their probability of being marginalized and demoted from their position.  
Altogether, women who succeed in climbing the career ladder are probably a highly selected 
group of women. This might bias their wages upwards and also might bias the coefficients of 
the independent variables in the wage equations. In gender-segregated occupations in 
particular this bias might has substantial effects not only on wages but also on the chances of 
promotion. There is some evidence of a strong negative effect on promotion probabilities for 
women working in a female occupation (Maume 1999). Again, this can be explained with 
mechanisms of devaluation of women’s jobs: employers provide fewer training opportunities 
in such jobs and female occupations therefore offer more limited chances of entering 
management. In terms of allocative discrimination the effect should be stronger for women 
than for men due to gender status beliefs and different competence expectations. It is therefore 
assumed that: 
 
H4: The wage effect of working in a gender-segregated occupation is even stronger when the 
gender-specific promotion probability is taken into account. 
 
  73  Models and Estimation Methods 
 
We first estimate a wage equation according to Mincer (Mincer 1974) with additional human 
capital variables, variables related to gender-specific labor market segregation and variables 
connected to social structure/family circumstances (see Section 4). We are employing a 
multiple linear panel regression with fixed effects separately for women and men that, i.e. we 
only consider within-person changes over time (Allison 2009). One main advantage of this 
method is that it controls for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, Therefore, variables 
that vary between but not within persons (like ability or personality traits) are excluded from 
the model. 
However, there might also be another kind of selection bias that is not controlled for in the 
fixed effects model per se: the selection into managerial positions. Women who receive a 
management position might be highly selected. This may result in an overestimation of their 
wages and therefore in biased coefficients. To correct for such a selection bias, we use a 
special version of Heckman’s correction (Heckman 1979) which is applicable for fixed effects 
regression (England et al. 1988; Berk 1983). Here, for each year of the time period in our 
panel we perform a cross sectional logit regression model that predicts working in a 
management position for women and men. From these equations we compute an instrumental 
variable that is the predicted probability of holding a managerial position (versus not holding 
a managerial position) for women and men in each year. This instrumental variable is added 
to the wage equations to control for sample selectivity bias. A common method is to estimate 
a probit model and use the inverse Mills ratio as an instrumental variable (Greene 2003). In 
this paper, the predicted probabilities based on logit models as described above are used. We 
decided to do this because the results of the variable can be interpreted in a more 
straightforward manner. However, we estimated also a probit model, the coefficients did not 
differ between the two strategies. 
In a last step, the wage differential between women and men is decomposed using the 
Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition method (Jann 2008; Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973).
3 With this, 
it is possible to quantify more precisely how much each variable is able to explain the gender 
pay gap. To this end, the gender-specific wage difference is split into different effects:  
                                                 
3 We also utilized an Oaxaca-style decomposition (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) using the coefficients from a 
pooled model over both groups as the reference coefficients (Oaxaca/Ransom 1994). For the STATA ado-files, 
see Jann 2008 (Jann 2008). The result is described in a footnote in chapter 5.. 
  8•  Endowment effect (E): This part, which is also called the “explained” effect is the portion 
of the gender pay gap that can be explained with gender-specific differences in the 
endowments of the independent variables. This value corresponds to the percentage wage 
loss that men would experience if they had the same qualifications, working experience, 
and other characteristics taken into account in the model as women, and if these 
characteristics were valued the same way for women as for men. Technically, it is the 
difference in the average variable values between the two groups multiplied by the 
coefficient calculated for the male group. 
•  Residual effect (R): This is also called the “unexplained” part and shows the portion of the 
gender pay gap that cannot be explained by gender-specific differences in endowments of 
the variables included in the model but by the different monetary values attributed to the 
characteristics. It shows how much more women would earn if their qualifications, 
working experience, etc. were rewarded to the same extent as men’s. Technically, the 
differential between the coefficients estimated for men and for women multiplied by the 
average of each variable for the female group plus the difference in the shift coefficients is 
taken into account. This residual effect is frequently interpreted as “discrimination.” 
However, caution is required since this component also includes unobserved differences 
between groups, e.g., career motivation (Chevalier 2007). In addition, some differences in 
the variables recorded could be due to discrimination, for instance, if it is more difficult 
for women to enter particular forms of education or employment (Olsen/Walby 2004). 
 
4  Data and Determinants of Earnings 
 
The wage estimations are based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) for the years 2001-2008 (Wagner et al. 2007). The sample observed consists of 
persons in management posotions working full-time. Full-time work is defined as working 
with an agreed weekly work time of 35 hours or more or with an actual weekly work time of 
35 hours or more if no work time is agreed. 
Persons in managerial positions are defined as being at least 18 years old and having 
described themselves as white-collar full-time employees in the private sector with 
(1) extensive managerial duties (e.g. managing director, manager, head of a large firm or 
concern) or with 
  9(2) managerial function or highly qualified duties (e.g. scientist, attorney, head of 
department). 
The inclusion of the second group of employees was important because of the small number 
of women in top management positions in Germany: the case numbers for this group in the 
SOEP sample would not allow for more in-depth analysis. The limitation to the private sector 
is due to the differences between the private and public sector in the mechanisms for 
promotion and payment. In addition, studies have shown that the gender pay gap is 
particularly high in the upper wage quintile, especially in the private sector (Arulampalam et 
al. 2006).  
Our dependent variable is the (logarithmic) real gross monthly earnings of women and men. 
The earnings are adjusted for inflation while dividing the earnings by the consumer price 
index. Taking the logarithm of the gross monthly earnings allows us to interpret the regression 
coefficients as a percentage change of the wage when the particular independent variable 
increases by one unit. Gross monthly earnings were used instead of the gross hourly earnings 
because overtime in managerial positions is generally not paid extra. Long working hours are 
common in management and therefore covered by the monthly income. Hourly earnings do 
not take this fact into consideration. Nevertheless, we control for the actual weekly working 
time. 
The following independent variables are used for the wage estimations: 
 
Human Capital: As important human capital resources for income, we take into account the 
duration of education (in years), the actual work experience (full-time plus part-time, in years 
provided by the SOEP), as well as the work experience squared as an indicator of the 
diminishing marginal utility of the work experience. This variable also indirectly corresponds 
with age, which we had to drop from our model due to multicollinearity reasons. The human 
capital factors mentioned do not yet include the accumulation of firm-specific human 
capital—“on-the-job training”—in the firm which is also an important resource affecting 
income (Blau et al. 2006; Tam 2000, 1997). Because of this we also include the length of 
employment with current employer (in years) in our model. 
 
Segregation: As an important variable concerning horizontal segregation we include the 
percentage of women in each job as a predictor for the wage. This indicator shows, for each 
year, the percentage of women and men employed in typical female, gender-integrated, and 
  10male jobs. The variable has been computed by taking the mean percentage of women in each 
job from the job classification of the German Federal Office of Statistics.
4 The values for each 
year have been taken from a special evaluation of the German Microcensus, conducted by the 
German Federal Office of Statistics. However, it has to be kept in mind that the occupation-
specific values of this variable vary over time. This is a problem in the longitudinal analysis, 
because these variations cannot be explained by the variables included. They are due to 
unobserved mechanisms on the labor market that are not controlled for in the models. Thus, 
we have computed the mean percentage of women in each occupation over the time period 
2001-2008, so that each job has a constant value in each year. We have also computed the 
variance of the percentages of women in each job for the same period. This information 
serves as a control variable for possible effects of this procedure in all analyses. The 
coefficients of this control variable are not shown in the tables. In a last step, to show whether 
and to what extent the effects of the variable may be non-linear the job gender segregation 
variable has been categorized as follows: male job (percentage of women 0-30 percent), 
integrated job (percentage of women 31-69 percent) and female job (percentage of women 70-
100 percent).  
We also consider the economic sector and the number of employees at the place of 
employment. The assumption is that the wage options in the manufacturing industry are better 
than in parts of the service sector. In addition, in larger firms, there are often internal labor 
markets and better opportunities for promotion meaning that the chances of having a higher 
income are on average higher here than in small firms (Lengfeld 2010; for a descriptive 
overview, see Busch/Holst 2008; for the theory of internal labor markets, see Doeringer/Piore 
1971). To give a better picture of segregation at different hierarchical levels (vertical 
segregation), we also include information on whether the person performs extensive 
managerial duties or managerial functions/highly qualified duties.  
 
Finally, we include further control dimensions in the multivariate analysis:  
•  Control dimensions concerning social structure and family circumstances: To control for 
the different limitations women and men face due to family responsibilities, we include 
family status and the number of children aged 16 and below in the household as predictors 
for earnings. In addition, we include information on whether the person lives in Eastern 
                                                 
4 This classification for Germany is more appropriate in this study than the ISCO88-code (International Standard 
Classification of Occupations) to show the horizontal segregation and related inequalities because it contains 
many more job categories than the ISCO88. 
  11Germany (“new” federal states) or Western Germany (“old” federal states): On the one 
hand, in Eastern Germany, the wages are more compressed than in western Germany. On 
the other hand, it may be expected that the gender-specific pay differential is lower in the 
East than in the West due to more egalitarian structures in the new federal states (Trappe 
2006). This may also be reflected in a higher percentage of women in managerial 
positions in Eastern Germany (Brader/Lewerenz 2006). 
•  Control dimension actual working time per week: The actual working time per week takes 
into account the influence of the actual number of hours worked on earnings.  
•  Control dimension imputation of gross monthly earnings: Respondents normally answer 
questions on income at a lower rate than to other questions. This can lead to biases in the 
results because “item non-response” is generally not distributed proportionally across the 
different groups of the population. Consequently, in our analysis, we use the imputed 
gross monthly earnings provided in the SOEP (Grabka/Frick 2003). We also include a 
dummy variable that shows whether the particular income was imputed or not (results not 
shown in tables.)  
 
Selection variables: In the last step of our analysis, to estimate the selection into managerial 
positions (Heckman’s correction) we use a sample consisting of white-collar employees 
working full-time in the private sector comparing those who are in leadership positions in this 
group with those who are not, using logistic regressions for each year. We include the same 
independent variables in the selection equation as in the wage equation,
5 as well as the 
additional variables current health (varying from 1 “very good” to 5 “bad”) and information 
on whether there are children 6 years or younger in the household. Further, we control for 
high-income subsample G: the SOEP was enlarged in 2002 to include the high-income 
subsample G (households with a monthly net income of over 3,835 euros) with the objective 
of providing a more extensive database for the analysis of life circumstances, income, and 
asset accumulation of households in the upper-income range (Schupp et al. 2003). Persons 
living in these households are also included in our analysis. In the logistic regression models 
of the probability of holding a managerial position we control for whether the person is part of 
the subsample or not (results not shown in tables).  
 
                                                 
5 The variable for whether the person performs extensive managerial duties or highly qualified duties or a 
managerial function (vertical segregation) is not entered into the selection equation because this information 
cannot be observed for individuals in non-managerial positions. 
  12The following table gives an overview of the applied predictors on earnings for persons in 
managerial positions employed full-time in the private sector pooled for the years 2001-2008. 
 
Table 1: Women and men in full-time management positions in the private 
sector: Overview of predictors 2001-2008 
 Men  Women 
 Mean  Std. Dev. 
(within)  N n  Mean  Std. Dev. 
(within)  N n 
Dependent variable             
(Real) Gross monthly earnings (euro)  5150.91 1254.63  7609  2142  3522.08  554.22  1819  703 
Human capital             
Duration of education (in years)  14.98 0.21 7533  2119  15.06 0.14 1795  692 
Work experience (in years)  19.88 1.81 7494  2039  17.06 1.64 1788  673 
Work experience
2 498.53  79.27  7494  2039  391.35  67.63  1788  673 
Length of employment with current 
employer (in years)  11.71 2.29 7609  2142  9.42  1.73 1818  702 
Family circumstances             
Married and living with spouse (=1)  0.75  0.15  7609  2142  0.51  0.15  1819  703 
Number of children in household aged 
under 16  0.78 0.33  7609  2142  0.29 0.20 1819  703 
Organization             
Economic sector                 
   Manufacturing industry  0.51 0.17  7557  2130  0.28 0.13 1800  700 
   Trade, hotels and catering, transport 0.15  0.13  7557 2130 0.21  0.11  1800 700 
   Other services  0.34  0.15 7557  2130  0.51  0.12 1800  700 
Number of employees at place of 
employment             
   Fewer than 20  0.13  0.12 7590  2138  0.22  0.13 1812  701 
   20 – 199 employees  0.28  0.19  7590  2138  0.28  0.18  1812  701 
   200 – 1,999 employees  0.24  0.21 7590  2138  0.23  0.17 1812  701 
   2,000 employees or more  0.34 0.19  7590  2138  0.27 0.15 1812  701 
Segregation             
With extensive managerial duties (=1) 0.17  0.18  7609 2142 0.11  0.16  1819 703 
Percentage of women in job: 
Categories             
   Male job  0.69  0.19  7505  2127  0.37  0.20  1800  696 
   Integrated job  0.27  0.19 7505  2127  0.44  0.20 1800  696 
   Female job  0.05  0.11  7505  2127  0.19  0.14  1800  696 
Promotion probability  0.73 0.06  7224  1985  0.50 0.09 1712  648 
Controls             
Actual working time per week (in 
hours)  48.41 3.61 7594  2141  45.69 3.52 1812  702 
Place of residence: New (eastern) 
federal states (=1)  0.16 0.05  7609  2142  0.29 0.03 1819  703 
For information only: Age in years  44.60 1.80 7609  2142  41.19 1.62 1819  703 
Source: SOEP 2001-2008, authors’ calculations. 
 
With a mean real gross monthly income of 3,522 euros women earn 68 percent of the male 
mean income. Hence, the gender pay gap is 32 percent. As far as education is concerned, the 
human capital accumulation is balanced: both women and men have on average almost 15 
years of education. However, women have only 17 years of work experience compared to 
nearly 20 years for men. This difference is essentially age-related: as can be see in the table 
women employed full-time in managerial positions in our sample are on average around three 
  13years younger than their male counterparts. Furthermore, men work longer on average for the 
same employer (11.7 years versus 9.4 years for women). 
Much stronger gender-specific differences can be observed in occupations: 69 percent of men 
work in male jobs. Interestingly, women in management do not work mainly in female jobs; 
only a minority of them works in these occupations (19 percent). This may be due to the fact 
that women’s occupations provide limited chances of promotion. The majority of women 
work in gender-integrated occupations. In addition, only 11 percent of the women but 17 
percent of the men work in top positions with extensive managerial duties. These results 
indicate a kind of glass ceiling effect that reduces women’s chances of being promoted. 
Furthermore, fewer women than men in managerial positions work in the manufacturing 
industry or in large companies with 2,000 or more employees. Women are, conversely, more 
often employed in “other services” (e.g., banking and insurance, real estate, legal, and other 
service professions). 
Marked differences can also be seen in the variables concerning social structure and family 
circumstances: compared to men, fewer women in managerial positions are married and they 
have a lower mean number of children in the household. 
Women’s lower chances of promotion can be seen in the mean value of the instrumental 
variable that is included later in the models to control for selection bias: women have, on 
average, a net promotion probability of 50 percent; men’s promotion probability is much 
higher at 73 percent. To what extent this may affect the results of the multivariate analysis 
will be shown in the next chapter. 
 
5  Results of the Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the fixed effects regression for men and women and states 
whether the differences in the coefficients are significant. It also shows the results of the 
Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition. The analysis was computed in a first step without controlling 
for selection into a managerial position, and then in a second step with controlling for it.  
Without taking the chances of promotion into account, it can be seen that for women, moving 
from a male job to an integrated job significantly decreases wages. The difference in this 
effect between men and women is significant. This is despite the fact that human capital 
indicators have been controlled for. Therefore, this effect cannot be explained by different 
human capital accumulations or self-selection of women into more “female” occupations that 
  14require less human capital accumulation. It can, however, be explained by an evaluative 
devaluation of occupations with a higher share of women. Also, there is evidence of allocative 
discrimination, because the wage penalty is significantly stronger for women. Therefore, 
hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 are partly confirmed.  
There are two findings that prevent full confirmation of these three hypotheses: first, moving 
from a male to a female job has negative effects only for men. However, the difference 
between women and men is not significant here. Second, the effects of working in a 
segregated occupation are not linear for women; if women move from a male to a female job 
there is no significant wage penalty. These results change after accounting for promotion 
effects. The significant effect for men moving to a female job diminishes and the effect for 
women moving to an integrated job increases in magnitude. Therefore, not accounting for 
selection into management biases the coefficients of the segregation variables: they are 
overestimated for men and underestimated for women. This confirms the assumption that 
selection into management—which is even stronger for women due to the glass ceiling 
effect—biases the effects of segregation on wages if the promotion probability is not taken 
into consideration.  
As research has shown, in addition to the general glass ceiling effect women’s chances of 
being promoted are low especially for women in female jobs. If women in such jobs reach a 
management position despite all the barriers they may be especially highly selected and the 
wages of women in these jobs may therefore be overestimated. This may obscure a negative 
wage effect of working in a more female job if selection bias is not controlled for. 
The opposite is true for men: men’s probability of being promoted in women’s jobs is not be 
as low as women’s meaning that the wages of men in such jobs are underestimated. Thus, 
Hypothesis H4 is confirmed.
6  
But still, the question arises why the wage effect of working in male jobs, integrated jobs, or 
female jobs is not linear for women. This result contradicts other studies that do not focus on 
managerial positions and also contradicts previous results that focus on management positions 
but do not estimate fixed effects (Busch/Holst 2009). This non-linear effect might be due to 
the observation that relatively few women and especially few men in leadership positions 
work in women’s jobs.  
                                                 
6 In the appendix we present as an example the results on what extent having a male, female, or integrated job 
affect someone’s chances of holding a managerial position for a single year (2008). The model gives clear 
evidence that working in a segregated job significantly affects promotion probabilities. This is to a lstronger 
extent due to women. 
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Table 2: Men and women in full-time management positions in the private 
sector: Determinants of gross monthly income (real) 2001-2008 (fixed effects 
model) 
   Without Promotion Probability  With Promotion Probability 
 Men  Women  Δwomen-men Men  Women  Δwomen-men 
Human Capital        
Duration of education (in years) 0.027***  0.008    0.021**  0.014   
Work experience (in years)  0.094*** 0.035  -*  0.093*** 0.034  -* 
Work experience
2  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  
Length of employment with current employer (in 
years)  -0.002* -0.001    -0.002* -0.001   
Family circumstances        
Married and living with spouse (ref.: married but 
separated/unmarried)  0.018  0.035  0.013  0.035  
Number of children in household aged under 16  0.004  0.015    0.001  0.019   
Segregation        
With extensive managerial duties (ref: with 
highly qualified duties or managerial function)  0.033***  0.091*** +** 0.033***  0.092*** +** 
Economic sector (ref.: manufacturing industry)             
   Trade, hotels and catering, transport -0.009  -0.005    0.000  -0.001   
   Other services  -0.026**  -0.092*** -*  -0.024*  -0.082** -*** 
Number of employees at place of employment  
(ref.: fewer than 20)        
   20 – 199 employees  0.033**  0.010    0.029*  0.010   
   200 – 1,999 employees  0.037** 0.031    0.033* 0.028   
   2,000 employees or more  0.050*** 0.119***    0.045** 0.113***   
Percentage of women in each job: Categories 
(ref.: male job)        
   Integrated job  -0.007  -0.049** -*  0.002  -0.067***  -*** 
   Female job  -0.044**  -0.004    -0.013  -0.038   
Promotion probability      0.149***  -0.104  -*** 
Controls        
Actual working time per week (in hours) 0.004***  0.004***   0.002***  0.005***  +* 
Place of residence: new (eastern) federal states 
(ref.: old (western) federal states)  0.037 0.005    0.042 -0.010   
Year  (ref.:  2001)        
   2002  -0.050***  0.005    -0.053***  0.010  +* 
   2003  -0.089***  0.010    -0.088***  0.011   
   2004  -0.135***  0.018  +*  -0.136***  0.022  +* 
   2005  -0.200***  0.024  +*  -0.201***  0.029  +** 
   2006  -0.266***  0.023  +**  -0.267***  0.033  +** 
   2007  -0.329***  0.033  +**  -0.327***  0.044  +** 
   2008  -0.380***  0.032  +**  -0.382***  0.046  +** 
Constant 6.433***  7.421*** --- 6.505*** 7.340***  --- 
N  7224 1712 8936 7224 1712 8936 
Number  of  groups  1985 648 2633  1985 648 2633 
R-squared (within)  0.082  0.125 0.0898 0.084 0.127  0.0919 
Endowment effect      0.221***      0.240*** 
Residual effect      0.150***      0.131*** 
        
Wage differential     0.371***     0.371*** 
% share of explained effect on wage differential   59.57    64.69 
% share of unexplained effect on wage differential   40.43    35.31 
* Level of significance < 10 percent; ** level of significance < 5 percent; *** level of significance < 1 percent. 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross real monthly earnings, controlling for imputed earnings and for the variance of the 
percentage of women in each job for the years 2001-2008.                                                                                             
Source: SOEP 2001-2008, authors’ calculations. 
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“endowment part” is nearly 60 percent.
7 Therefore, 40 percent of the wage differential 
remains unexplained. However, after including the promotion probability in the models the 
explained part is 65 percent and thus increases by 5 percentage points. The promotion 
probability is higher for men and the coefficient shows that the promotion probability has a 
positive effect on men’s wages. In other words: men’s wages are underestimated because they 
have above-average chances of getting into high positions. This can be further illustrated if we 
look in greater detail at the results of the decomposition (Table 3): here, the independent 
variables of the wage equation have been grouped and the endowment effects of the variables 
have been summed up by group. As can be seen, different human capital endowments explain 
about half of the overall endowment effect. This is mainly due to different endowments in 
work experience. The second large part of the total endowment effect comes from the 
promotion probability; 9.43 percentage points of the wage differential can be explained with 
different chances of reaching the higher levels of the career ladder. Further, it can be seen that 
segregation explains 3.23 percentage points of the wage differential. 
 
Table 3: Men and women in full-time management 
positions in the private sector: Oaxaca-Blinder 
Decomposition - Endowment effects (E) of variable groups 
 E  In  % 
Human Capital  18.40  49.60 
   Duration of education  -0.20  -0.54 
   Work experience  25.10  67.65 
   Work experience
2  -6.10  -16.44 
   Length of employment with current employer  -0.40  -1.08 
Family circumstances  0.40  1.08 
Segregation 1.20  3.23 
Promotion probability 3.50  9.43 
Controls 0.50  1.35 
Total endowment effect  24.00  64.69 
Residual effect  13.10  35.31 
Wage differential  37.10  100.00 
Results of the Oaxaca/Blinder Decomposition, based on the wage equations with fixed effects 
and promotion probability for women and men (Table 2).     
Source: SOEP 2001-2008, authors’ calculations. 
 
However, even after including the promotion probability in the models, much of the gender 
pay gap still remains unexplained. This may be a reflection of time-varying social and cultural 
conditions such as discriminatory policies and practices in the labor market, among other 
things. 
                                                 
7 A decomposition method Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) (see footnote 4) indicates an even lower “explained part” 
of the wage differential, namely 51 percent (results not shown). 
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6  Conclusions 
 
The aim of the paper was it to analyze the gender pay gap of persons in managerial positions 
in Germany controlling for selection into managerial positions and time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity. A special focus was placed on the wage effects of working in a gender-
segregated occupation. The results of the fixed effects model show that working in a more 
female job compared to working in a male job affects wages negatively (evaluative 
discrimination). These mechanisms have even more severe effects on women (allocative 
discrimination). However, the effect is not linear; the wage penalties for women occur only in 
integrated jobs and not in female jobs. The devaluation of occupations where men are not in 
the majority is more evident when promotion probabilities are analyzed: here, we find even 
stronger evidence of evaluative as well as allocative discrimination.  
More research is needed to explain why women experience such a severe wage penalty in 
integrated occupations in particular. Our analysis has shown that one-third of the pay gap still 
remains unexplained. Future research has to go deeper into the phenomenon in order to better 
explain the gender pay gap. The analysis suggests also that time-varying effects of social and 
cultural conditions are influencing wages. These are quantitatively very difficult to measure 
but might have an impact on the gender pay gap. To capture these effects datasets on 
employers would be useful to identify the factors that influence the recruitment and promotion 
of managers which could then be merged with data on employees. Of particular interest would 
be information on network structures as well as on existing prejudices about the traits and 
abilities of men and women that play an important role in selection and promotion. 
Another finding is that work experience has a large effect on wages. This is mainly due to age 
differences between women and men in management positions. This makes the catching-up 
process difficult for women. Also, management positions are usually combined with long 
working hours that hardly allow reconcile the demands of work and family. This is mainly a 
problem for women and might also be a reason why the young, well-educated generation of 
women is moving into these higher and better-paid jobs so slowly. 
Our results indicate that policy should focus on measures to reduce gender segregation in the 
labor market and on enforcing women equal chances of promotion. Initiatives allowing both 
men and women to better reconcile family and work are still essential also in management 
positions. All these efforts constitute steps in the right direction, but they are not enough. The 
  18biggest challenge for the future will be to overcome gender stereotypes. While gender 
stereotypes are often not recognized by either men or women they can substantially reduce 
women’s chances on the labor market and be responsible for an implicit devaluation of 
women’s work and abilities, This leads to lower wages of women—a finding that holds for 
women in management positions as well. More transparency in decisions on employment, 
promotion, and pay will be one step in improving women’s chances on the labor market. 
Further measures to improve women’s chances could be taken by companies to set concrete 
and sustainable targets for equal pay and more equal proportions of female managers. To 
accelerate growth in the number of female managers in Germany and to overcome the 
obviously strong persistence of existing gender structures in firms gender quotas in executive 
positions are discussed both in Germany and partly introduced for the supervisory boards of 
publicly-traded company in other countries of the European Union. On a more basic level, a 
culture of gender-neutral organization and decision-making in firms would help to pave the 
way to improve women’s chances and achieve equal pay. 
 
7  Appendix 
 
As an example we present here the results on what extent having a male, female, or integrated 
job affect someone’s chances of holding a managerial position. Table 4 shows the results of 
the logistic regression model computed to estimate the wage equation with promotion 
probability as the instrumental variable for a single year (2008). The model gives clear 
evidence that working in a segregated job significantly affects promotion probabilities. There 
is also linearity in the effect: the chances of working in management are lower in integrated 
jobs than in male jobs. In female jobs, the situation is even worse. This means that an 
evaluative devaluation of women’s jobs is at work in the probability of promotion. 
Furthermore, the differences here between women and men are significant: the more “female” 
a job is, the lower chances of promotion women holding such jobs will have. This means that 
a kind of allocative discrimination is at work in promotion: even if men and women work full-
time in the same occupation, women’s chances of promotion will be lower than men’s. 
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probability 2008 (logit) 
 Men  Women  Δwomen-men 
Human Capital      
Duration of education (in years)  0.538***  0.467***   
Work experience (in years)  0.078***  0.087**   
Work experience
2 -0.001  -0.001   
Length of employment with current employer (in years)  0.000  -0.001   
Family circumstances      
Married and living with spouse (reference value: married but 
separated/unmarried)  0.197 -0.438*  -** 
Number of children in household aged under 16  0.245**  0.547**   
Segregation      
Economic sector (reference value: manufacturing industry)       
   Trade, hotels and catering, transport  -0.402**  0.426  +** 
   Other services  -0.227  0.443*  +** 
Number of employees at place of employment  (reference value: 
fewer than 20)      
   20 – 199 employees  0.053  -0.168   
   200 – 1,999 employees  0.330  0.367   
   2,000 employees or more  0.001  0.082   
Percentage of women in each job: Categories (ref. : male job)       
   Integrated job  -0.610***  -1.131***  -* 
   Female job  -0.822***  -1.812***  -*** 
Additional selection variables      
Children 6 years or younger in HH  0.083  0.020   
Perceived current health  -0.223**  -0.274**   
Controls      
Actual working time per week (in hours)  0.090***  0.105***   
Place of residence: new (eastern) federal states (reference 
value: old (western) federal states)  -0.283 -0.446*   
Constant -11.819***  -12.106***   
N 1481  982  2463 
Pseudo R-squared  0.3428  0.3646  0.4074 
* Level of significance < 10 percent; ** level of significance < 5 percent; *** level of significance < 1 percent. 
Dependent variable: Being in a leadership position versus not being in a leadership position, controlling for subsample G, 
imputed earnings, and the variance in the percentage of women in each job for the years 2001-2008. 
Source: SOEP 2001-2008, authors’ calculations. 
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